Sabina Spielrein, M.D.
Translated by: Stuart K. Witt.
 In my work with sexual problems one question has especially interested me: why this most powerful drive, the drive of reproduction [Fortpflanzungstrieb], houses within itself, next to the a priori expected positive feelings, negative ones like anxiety and disgust, the latter of which really has to be overcome so that one can get to the positive activity. The negative attitude of the individual toward sexual activity [Sexualbetätigung] is, of course, especially evident in neurotics. So far as I know, individual researchers have sought the explanation of this resistance [Widerstandes] in our mores, in the upbringing of our children which endeavors to keep the drive within limits, and therefore teaches every child to regard the realization of sexual desires as something bad, forbidden. Some find the frequency with which mental images [Vorstellungen] of death are combined with sexual desires striking, even as death becomes interpreted as a symbol of the moral fall (Stekel). (2)
Gross derives the feeling of disgust for sexual products from the spatial coexistence with dead excretions. Freud traces the resistances, the anxiety, back to the repression [Verdrängung] of the otherwise positive sensual desires. Bleuler sees in the defense [Abwehr] the necessary negative, which must also coexist with the positive emotional image. In Jung I found the following passage:
The passionate yearning, i.e., the libido, has two sides: it is the power which beautifies everything and under certain circumstances destroys everything. One often behaves as if one could not quite understand what the destroying quality of the creative power could possibly be. A woman who abandons herself to her passions, especially under today's cultural circumstances, experiences the destructive quality only too soon. One must take one's imagination a little outside the realm of bourgeois morality  in order to understand what a feeling of boundless insecurity overcomes the human being who surrenders herself unconditionally to fate. Even giving birth—that itself is self-destruction, for with the birth of the following generation the preceding one has passed its peak. So our descendants become our most dangerous enemies, with whom we cannot cope, for they will outlive us and take the power from our enfeebled hands. Anxiety before erotic fate is entirely understandable, for there is something unforeseeable in it. Fate usually holds unknown dangers, and the continual reluctance of neurotics to take chances with their life is explained by the wish to be permitted to stand aside, in order not to have to participate in the dangerous battle of life. Whoever renounces the risk of experience must suffocate the desire for it, i.e., commit a kind of suicide. From that the death fantasies are explained, which readily accompany the renunciation of the erotic wish(3).
I deliberately quote Jung's words in such detail because his remarks correspond for the most part with my own results, in that he points out an unknown danger which lies in erotic activity; besides, it is very important for me that a male individual is also conscious of a danger that is not only social in character. Jung brings the death images [Todesvorstellungen], to be sure, not into agreement with but in opposition to sexual images. From my experiences with girls I can say that normally the feeling of anxiety steps into the foreground of the feelings of repression [Verdrängungsgefühle], when the possibility of the wish realization first occurs, and to be sure, it is a quite certain form of anxiety: One feels the enemy in herself, it is her own love heat, which compels her with an iron necessity to do what she does not want; she feels the end, the passing away [das Vergängliche], from which she might try in vain to escape into unknown distant lands. Is that all? one might ask. Is that the peak and nothing more besides? What happens with the individual in sexual activity that warrants such a mood?
I. BIOLOGICAL FACTS
In procreation there occurs a uniting of female and male cells. Each cell is thereby destroyed [vernichtet] as a unit, and new life emerges from this product of destruction. Some lower forms of life, e.g., the mayfly, lose their life in the production  of the new generation and die. Creation for these beings is at the same time destruction [Untergang], which in itself is most terrifying to the living. If this particular destruction [Untergang] places itself in the service of the new creation, then it is longed for [ersehnt] by the individual.
With the more highly organized individual, which no longer consists of a single cell, of course the whole individual is not destroyed in the sexual act. However, the sexual cells decaying as a unit are elements not indifferent to the organism but most profoundly connected with the entire life of the individual. They contain the entire progenitor in concentrated form, by which they are continually influenced during development and which they continually influence as well in its development. These most important extracts [Extrakte] of the individual are destroyed with impregnation.
Corresponding to the uniting of sexual cells, the most profound uniting of two individuals occurs during the act of copulation: one pushing into the other. The difference is only quantitative: It is not the entire individual that is absorbed, but only a part of it, which however in this moment represents the value of the entire organism. The male part dissolves [löst … auf] itself into the female part; the female part becoming restive develops a new form through the foreign intruder. The transformation affects the entire organism; destruction and regeneration, which are always taking place under ordinary circumstances, take place abruptly. The organism discharges the sex product like any excretion.
It would be unlikely that the individual would not have a premonition or at least feelings corresponding to this destruction-reconstruction process in its organism. Just as the ecstatic feelings corresponding to becoming [Werden] are themselves present in the reproductive drive, so too are the defensive feelings: as anxiety and disgust are not the consequences of a false linkage with the spatially coexistent excretions, not the negative which signifies a renunciation of sexual activity; rather they are feelings which correspond to the destructive components of the sexual instinct.
II. INDIVIDUAL PSYCHOLOGICAL REFLECTIONS
There is a paradoxical ring to the assertion that generally we experience nothing psychological at all in the present, and yet it is true.  For us an event is emotional [gefühlsbetont] only insofar as it can stir up earlier experienced emotional contents (experience [Erleben sic]) which lie hidden in the unconscious. One sees this best in an example: A girl loves to read witch stories; it turns out that as a child she liked to imitate a witch, and the analysis reveals that the witch, in the girl's fantasy, represents her mother, with whom the former [i.e., the girl] identifies herself. The witch stories are therefore only pleasurable [lustbetont] insofar as the life of the mother, which the girl would also like to experience, is pleasurable for her. The witch stories are only allegories [Gleichnisse] which represent the desired situation, the already occurred life story of the mother, upon which allegories the emotion is simply displaced [verschoben]. Without her experience of her mother, the witch stories would not be pleasurable to the girl. In this sense “everything transitory” [“alles Vergängliche”] (4) is only a saying that symbolizes some original event [Urereignis] unknown to us, which looks for analogs in the present. In this sense we experience nothing in the present, although we project the emotion into the present mental image. The present witch-image in my example was conscious; the assimilation to the past took place in the unconscious (experience of witches = experience of mother), from which the present differentiates itself. Every conscious thought- or image-content is accompanied by similar unconscious contents, by which the results of conscious thinking are translated [umsetzt] into the language peculiar to the unconscious; and this parallel train of thought lets itself be detected best in the state of fatigue described by Silberer. Two examples from Silberer may make this clear:
Example No. 1: “I think of something, that I intend to make a rough situation better [eine holprige Stelle auszubessern].” Symbol: “I see myself planing a piece of wood.”
Example No. 2: “I am thinking about the advancing [Vordringung] of the human spirit in the difficult area of the problem of the Mothers” (Faust, Part 2). (5) Symbol: “I am standing on a lonely pebble beach that stretches far into a dark sea. The water of the sea almost fuses at the horizon with the deeply hued, mysteriously black air.
Meaning: The advancing into the dark sea corresponds to the pressing forward into the dark problem. The fusing of air and water, the blurring of above and below, might symbolize as with the Mothers (as Mephistopheles describes) that all times and all places fuse together with each other, that there is no boundary between “above” and “below,” and that hence Mephistopheles can say to the travel-ready Faust: “Descend then—I could also say: climb!”
 The examples are very instructive: One sees how the train of thought adapted to the present is assimilated in the unconscious to the past “experiences” carried across many generations. The expression “rough situation” in the work (Example 1) is taken as a simile [Gleichnis] from another image-content, that of wood-planing. In consiousness [Im Bewusstsein] the expression is adapted metaphorically to the present, and is accordingly differentiated from its origin. On the other hand, the unconscious with “wood-planing,” lends anew the original meaning of “make better” to the words “rough situation”; in this way it converts the present activity of bettering into an already more familiar activity of wood-planing.
The second example is interesting insofar as it, like the ancient peoples, sees the mother in the sea (the maternal, creating water, from which all life has come into being [enstanden]). The sea (“the mother”) into which one advances, is the dark problem, the state in which there are no time, no place, no contrasts (above and below), since—still undifferentiated, not creating the new—it is therefore something in an eternal state of being. The image [Bild] of the sea (mother) is also at the same time the image of the unconscious which simultaneously lives in the present, past, and future, and therefore outside of time; (6) for which all places fuse together (at the original place) and for which opposites mean the same thing. (7) Each of the differentiated mental images wants to be dissolved in this first mother (the unconscious), i.e., it wants to transform [verwandeln] itself into the undifferentiated state. If the patient I analyze, (8) e.g., says, “The earth was bored through,” instead of saying, “I was impregnated,” so is the earth the prime mother in the conscious or unconscious mental image of any people.
The differentiated mother = patient transforms herself into this prime mother. Not for nothing have Greek philosophers, as, e.g., Anaxagoras, sought the origin of world-weariness [Welt-schmerz] in the differentiation of beings [Seienden] from the primary elements. This pain consists precisely in the fact that each particle of our being longs for the back-transformation [Rückverwandlung] in its origins, from which then new becoming [Werden] comes forth.
Freud takes our later, direct or sublimated love impulses [Liebesregungen]  back to the infantile period, in which we felt the first feelings of pleasure through the persons who cared for us. We always seek to experience these sensations of pleasure [Lustempfindungen] anew, and even when consciousness has long worked out for itself a normal sexual goal, the unconscious is occupied with mental images which were pleasurable to us in earliest childhood. The opponents of Freud most indignantly resist the sexualization of innocent feelings of pleasure during childhood. Whoever has once made analyses himself cannot doubt that the erogenous zones of innocent children become the source of sexual pleasure in adults, whether they are aware of it or not. There may certainly be considerable variation, based on the constitution of the individual, in the preference for the one or the other zone. In any case, with neurotics we see especially clearly that the pleasure zone in childhood becomes the source of the sexual impulses toward the caretaking persons, face to face with the corresponding unconscious symbolism. That gives us the right to claim with Freud that in the infantile sources of pleasure we find the origin [Keime] of sexual pleasure in adults. At the discussions on the role of sexuality, I was told that one could derive everything just as well from the drive for food if one would only have the good will to do so. I should not leave unmentioned here the views of a French author, who derives all psychic activities [seelichen Regungen] from the drive for self-preservation. He means, for example, that the mother loves the child, since it relieves the mammary glands by suckling; one loves a man or a woman, since through coitus the excretion irritating the organism becomes removed rather harmlessly. The feeling of pleasure then becomes transferred to the object bringing relief. These objections say nothing against the Freudian teachings. Freud does not examine at all what constitutes the feeling of pleasure and how it comes into being. He begins with the stage in which the feeling of pleasure already exists, and there we actually see that infantile feelings of pleasure are earlier stages of the later feelings of sexual pleasure. It is exactly the same as when one grows fond of the caring hand of the nurse who satisfies the need for food in us. The relationship of the eating drive and, respectively, the self-preservation drive, with the survival-of-the-species drive (therefore also with the sexual instinct) is doubtless a very profound one. There are empirical facts to the effect that with sexual arousal eating can sometimes replace coitus. Two factors are at work here: on the one hand the pleasure in the process of eating, and on the other hand  the often increased appetite as result of the general arousal. The opposite is also observed. To be sure, the need for food cannot be entirely replaced by coitus, but we often see the overpowering sex drive [Geschlechtstrieb] especially in physically weakened individuals.
Insofar as we are searching for the causa movens of our conscious and unconscious I [Ich], I believe that Freud is right, when he accepts striving after the attainment of pleasure and the suppression [Unterdrückung] of displeasure as the basis of all psychic productions [Produktionen]. The pleasure goes back to infantile sources. Now, however, the question is whether our whole psychic life consists of this I-life [Ichleben]; are there not within us driving forces [Triebkräfte] which set our psychic content in motion unconcerned over the weal and woe of the I [Ich]? Do the well-known basic drives, of self- and species-preservation, also signify for the whole psychic life that which they mean for I-life, namely the source of pleasure or displeasure? I must emphatically take the view that the I-psyche [Ichpsyche], as well as the unconscious [Unbewusste], is governed by movements [Regungen] which lie still deeper and do not at all concern themselves with our feeling-reactions to the demands shaped [gestellten] by them. Pleasure is only the affirmative reaction of the I to these demands sprung from the deep, and we can directly have pleasure in displeasure and pleasure in pain which, taken in itself, is really unpleasant, for pain certainly corresponds to a damage to the individual, against which the self-preservation instinct in us bristles [sträubt]. Therefore, there is something in our depth which, as paradoxical as it may sound, wants this self-damaging, for the I reacts to it with pleasure. The desire for self-damage, the joy in pain, is however completely incomprehensible, if we only consider the I-life, which wants to have nothing but pleasure. The idea [Idee] of the I as being something entirely unessential, continually changing, only a certain momentary grouping of feelings of eternally existing elements, is supported by Mach [Ernst Mach, 1838-1916]. As a philosopher Mach is content with this scheme. For me the name of Jung is intimately connected with the name of Mach, for it is this researcher as well, who thinks of the mind as consisting of many individuals. It is indeed Jung who speaks of the complex-autonomy [Komplex-autonomie], so that according to him we have in us not an undivided I but various complexes, which contend [streiten] for priority. The most beautiful confirmation of his views is provided by the dementia-praecox patients, who so strongly feel the power of individual complexes separated from the I  that they regard their own unconscious wishes [WüUnsche] (my patient calls the wishes “suppositions” [“Vermutungen”]) as vital hostile beings. “The supposition could become reality in order to demonstrate its right to exist,” said the analysand.
I had to reach the insight that the principal characteristic of the individual consists in the fact that it is a dividuum [Dividuum]. The closer we get to conscious thinking, the more differentiated become our mental images; the deeper we reach into the unconscious, the more general, more typical become the images. The depth of our psyche knows no “I,” but only its summation, the “We” [das “Wir”]; (9) or the present “I” becomes, seen as object, subordinate to other similar objects. A patient's cranium was drilled, and under anesthesia his I-consciousness gradually faded away, and with it also the pain, but at the same time he perceived [vernahm] the impressions of the outside world so remote that, when they chiseled his skull, he called, “Come in.” This shows that he did perceive [wahrgenommen] his skull, but in the form of an object separated from the I, obviously in the form of a room. In such a way the separate parts of the personality are objectified. In the next example we see the objectification of the entire personality. My patient (10) reports on one of her states during anesthesia, in which she no longer felt the pain inflicted on her during the operation; yet she saw, instead of herself, wounded soldiers for whom she had compassion. Upon this is based the pain-stilling effect of children's little sayings—“It may hurt the dog, the cat, etc., but not the child itself.” Instead of seeing the injured little finger as part of itself, the child sees it as of another; instead of “my finger” we have the more general mental image of “somebody's finger.” How often one consoles oneself over a personal misfortune with the thoughts that it may happen to so many or to almost everyone, as if the pain were made easier for us through the thought of the regularity of its occurrence, by the elimination of the personal-accidental. What generally happened and happens is no longer a misfortune but an objective fact. The pain is based on the differentiation of the separated I-image. There I undertand a mental image which is tied to the “I”-consciousness [“Ich”-Bewusstsein]. It is known that compassion arises when one puts oneself in the place of the sufferer. Among dementia-praecox patients,  who transform the I-images into objective or type images, the inadequate affect, indifference, stands out; this fades immediately, when we succeed in bringing about an I-connection [Ichbeziehung]; when, e.g., the patient instead of saying “the earth became fouled with urine,” says, “I became fouled in the sexual act.” (11) Therein, in my opinion, lies the meaning [Sinn] of symbolic expression. The symbol indeed means the same as the embarrassing image; it is less differentiated, however, than the I-image. Under “woman” one can well imagine more contents, since they only need to resemble each other in the essentials, than in the much more sharply determined I-image of a Martha N. One could reply to this: If the dreamer takes another person in place of himself, the other person is no less sharply differentiated than the dreamer himself. That is only objectively correct: for each human other people exist, in general, only insofar as they are accessible to his psyche; as for the others, only that which corresponds to us exists for us. When the dreamer substitutes another person for himself, he does not care in the least to represent the person concerned as clearly as possible; there actually occurs a compression of different persons into one. It is only important to the dreamer to represent the quality in the substituted person, which corresponds to the realization of his desire. If the dreamer, e.g., wants to be envied on account of beautiful eyes, then she condenses different persons with beautiful eyes into a composite person, so that here too a type instead of the individual results, a type, which, as examinations of dreams and dementia-praecox patients show, corresponds to archaic ways of thinking.
Within hysteria, which has a hypertrophic I [Ichhypertrophie], there also exists a corresponding increased sensitivity. It would, however, be entirely unfair to claim that the psychological life of hysteria were more abundant than that of dementia praecox. The lack of I-activity only causes us to consider the typical, the archaic, analogous ways of thinking. Freud thinks that in dementia praecox we deal with libido withdrawal, the return of the libido, and then about the battle between libido withdrawal and libido fulfillment. In my  opinion it is a battle between the two antagonistic streams [Strömungen] of type-psyche and I-psyche. The type-psyche wants to make the I-image into an impersonal type, and the I-psyche resists this dissolving, such that the patients anxiously transfer the feeling-tone [Gefühlston] of the vanishing complexes onto some lateral association and fix the ‘I” on it (inadequate affect). The patients themselves, however, see that the feeling-tone does not correspond with the image to which it is transferred, and that they themselves “make” [“machen”] the previously existing affect. So it can be explained that they often laugh at their own pathos at the same time and consider everything a comedy. In the beginning of the illness we often see severe states of anxiety and depression, since the patient feels the tendency toward a flattening out of the emotional I-parts [Ichteile] as a tendency antagonistic to the needs of I-relation [Ichbeziehung], adaptation to the present. It is as if the early aroused feeling-tone had still not subsided while the objects no longer stand in an I-relation. The ruling sensation [Empfindung] in it is: The world is changed, eerily strange; it is like a theater play. At the same time the insight imposes itself: “I am a complete stranger to myself.” The thoughts become depersonalized; to the patients they become “made.” Since they come precisely from the depths outside the “I,” they make “we” or rather “they” out of the “I.” Since it no longer finds any objects, the still available feeling is expressed pathetically, just as a speaker is overacting pathetically who presents the feeling itself instead of the appropriate mental images. The anxiety is there as long as the still present feeling remains, i.e., the need for I-relation allows the patient to perceive the disintegration of the I [Ichverzall] (alien power). With the progress of the disease the well-known indifference appears: The patients no longer take anything personally; even if they say “I,” they are still objects which yet do not mean I and do not obey the will of the I [Ichwollen]. Thus a woman, who wants many children, can talk, smiling, about her 22,000 boys, as if it were not at all her real yearning. But the patients can now and then also have genuine, adequate feelings, and this I have seen in the production [Herstellung] of the direct, nonsymbolic I-relation. With cases that come into the institution, disorder has obviously so far progressed that the patient immediately sinks back into his inadequate attitude. Although the analysis is able to improve things there, the question remains about the future.
 Thus with the lowering of the feelings of pleasure and displeasure the psychic life does not die in the same measure; to be sure, the need for differentiation and the realization of personal desires expires, and, in contrast, the assimilation (thus disintegration) of the I-differentiated images to the mental images which entire peoples have developed occurs; hence a transformation into typical, very ancient, type-images [typische uralte Artvorstellungen]. These affectless images, which entire peoples have developed, instruct us about the content that accompanies our drives. The I-psyche can only wish for pleasure feelings, but beyond that the type-psyche teaches us what we really desire, what positive or negative feeling-tone is to us, and there we see that the type-wishes living in us do not correspond at all to the I-wishes, that the type-psyche wants the present [rezente] I-psyche assimilated, while the I, yes, every little part of the I, possesses the endeavor for self-preservation in the present form (inertia). The type-psyche, which accordingly denies the present I, recreates it, however, through this very denial, for the sunken little I-particle emerges clothed in new mental images richer than ever before.
This we see most beautifully in artistic productions. To be sure, the regression exists within the I in that one would like to relive pleasurable infantile experiences, but why are the infantile experiences so pleasurable to us? Why the “joy at recognizing the familiar?” (12) Why the strict censorship, which seeks to modify our experiences, even long after we no longer sense the parental power over us? Why don't we rather experience always the same and reproduce the same? (13) Thus there exists in us next to the inertia-wish a transformation-wish, the latter of which means that an individual image-content should be dissolved in a similar material deriving from past times, and so, at the expense of the individual a type-wish should develop, which is projected outward by the individual as art work. One looks for one similar to oneself (the parents, ancestors) in whom the individual I-particle can dissolve itself, since the dissolving in the similar does not proceed brusquely destroying but goes forward unnoticed. And yet, what does this  dissolving mean for the I-particle, if not death? To be sure, it reappears in a new, perhaps more beautiful form, but it is still not the same I-particle, but one producing others at the expense of this particle, just as a tree, growing up out of a seed, is certainly the same with reference to the type, but not the same with reference to the individual, and it is actually more a matter of taste whether we prefer to emphasize the existence in the new product developed at the expense of the old, or the deliberate fading of the old life. Pleasure or displeasure is also in accord with the thought of dissolving the entire I-complex. There are indeed examples from neurotics who directly say that they are afraid of sexual contact, since with ejaculation [Samenentleerung] a piece of the individual is also lost.
Everything that moves us wants to be communicated and understood or sensed [empfunden]. Each mental image [Vorstellung] which we hand over to our fellow human beings directly or in the form of a work of art is a product of a differentiation of primary experiences of which our psyche consists. Let us take as an example an already differentiated experience, e.g., a sunny spring day, which has given joy many times to countless generations before us. As we reproduce this experience, we must differentiate in that we shape the trees, the grass, the sky according to the present consciousness-content. We no longer are concerned with a spring day but with the special, personally colored spring day. And vice versa: If this differentiation-product reaches the psyche of another individual, then the reverse transformation takes place: By the conscious manufacturing [Verarbeitung] on the part of the other individual the spring day receives another individual character; next to the conscious process the mental image devolves upon the unconscious process, which seizes its present individual character, takes it down to the “Mothers” and dissolves it. In the unconscious we perhaps find the spring day broken down into its essential parts—the sun, the sky, the plants—and these rearranged, or perhaps more correctly, “back-formed” [“rückgestaltet”] into the mythological shapes known to us from folk-psychology. Indeed, with any expression of a thought and, respectively, with any description of an image, we make a generalization, for words are certainly symbols, which virtually serve to make the personal [Persönliche] generally human and understandable, i.e., to rob it of a personal character. The purely personal can  never be understood by others, and it does not surprise us when Nietzsche, a man with a powerful I-consciousness, comes to the conclusion: Language is there to bewilder itself and others. And yet we feel a relief with expression, when we form a type-image at the expense of our I-image, just as the artist enjoys his “sublimation-products” when he creates the typical instead of the individual. Each image seeks, as it were, a similar but not identical material, in which it can be dissolved and transformed. This similar material is the understanding resting on the same image-content, with which the other person receives our images. This understanding evokes a sympathetic feeling in us, which means nothing other than that one would like to give still more of oneself, until the affection, especially when we deal with individuals of a different sex, increases so far that one would want to surrender totally (the entire I). This most dangerous phase of the reproduction-drive, however, is accompanied by feelings of rapture, since the dissolution takes place within the similar beloved (= in love).
Since one loves in the beloved one's similar parents, it is understandable that one thereby also seeks to experience in reality the destiny of the ancestors, especially the parents (14) (cf. Jung, The Meaning of the Father for the Destiny of the Individual). Chance only plays a role in life insofar as the sexual experience already predestined in the psyche is activated or continues in the psyche as a possibility of experience. In the first case the complex is satisfied; in the other case the tension-provoking element is not satisfied and must continuously free itself by letting the analogous image-contents drain, which are forever supplemented anew. For the psychic life, therefore, the activation of the experience has only a negative meaning, removing the image-content together with the accompanying tension. Let us assume, for example, that one had attained the longed-for union with the love object. As soon as the reality comes into its right, as the word becomes the deed, the corresponding image-group dissolves, producing a happy feeling of relaxation; in this moment one is entirely unproductive psychically.
 Every mental image reaches its maximum life when it waits most intensively for its transformation into reality; with such realization it is destroyed at once. That does not mean that with the realization of a powerful complex the whole psychic life stands still, for a complex is only a tiny vanishing little part which is differentiated out of the prime experience [Urerlebnis]. This actual event produces ever new differentiation products, which are psychically transformed, now in the form of abreaction [Abreagierens], now as artwork. It is very important to emphasize that not all sublimation products, in content, are in opposition to the reproduction-wish that has been adapted to reality. They only appear as something contrastive [Entgegengesetztes], since they are less adapted to the present, less differentiated. They are more type-like in form, like some images of the “higher” love of nature or of Christ. Jung shows that in the sun one worships [verehrt] his own libido, the father living within him. (15) Since these images are not destroyed [vernichtet] through activation, they remain in the psyche undergoing the most intense yearning for the return to the original source [Ursprunge], especially for the dissolving into the progenitors [Erzeugern] (which is to be proven below). It is thus explained why religion likes to turn the symbol of the lowest, i.e., the sexual activity [Sexualbetätigung], into the highest. For example, take the Duke of Zinzendorf, analyzed by Pfister, or Mrs. M., analyzed by me. Through the complete denial of the love object standing outside of the I, one only attains the result that oneself becomes the object of his own libido, with the resulting self-destruction.
Stekel says in his “Contributions” to the meaning of dreams:
Just as dreams do not know denial in general, neither do they know any denial of life. Death—in dreams it means as much as life, and even the highest lust for life often expresses itself in a death wish. Incidentally, similar psychological points of view are also valid for suicide, and even the selection of the manner of death is influenced by certain erotic fantasies. These thoughts were repeatedly expressed by poets, and even the philosophers have again and again shed light on the connection between Eros and Tantalos [sic]. In dreams, as so frequently in life, murder is only a desire for sex murder [Lustmord] and often represents nothing other than a strongly sadistic-colored sexual act [“Beiträge zur Traumdeutung” (Contribution to the Meaning of Dreams), Jahrbuch, Vol. 1, 1909, pp. 458-512].
 Up to here I can connect with Stekel. But now he goes further:
A typical dream of young girls involves them standing naked on the street, when a big man rushes at them and shoves a knife in their stomach. In this case murder serves as an illustration of a deflowering through force; it is the honor which is irretrievably violated; it is the death of virginity, which again means the life of woman [Weibes].
Now I see absolutely no grounds which permit us to interpret death in these dreams as a moralistic death. After all, even Stekel himself has also seen a strongly sadistic-colored sexual act in real death. In accordance with the fact that the woman [Frau] is bored through [durchbohrt] in the sexual act, the girl, but also the woman, sees herself in the dream as a sacrifice of the sadistic-colored sexual act. For that reason, conditions of warfare are so conducive to the outbreak of neurosis, which has its ground in the disturbances of sexual life. It is war that proceeds with images of destruction [Destruktion]. Since one image gives rise to others related to it, images associated with the destroying components of the reproduction instinct will be stimulated by the images of destruction in war.
These latter images can also spoil [verleiden] existence [Dasein] for normal persons, as something altogether fleeting and purposeless, and above all for the neurotic, with whom the images of destruction anyway outweigh those of becoming [Werdens] and who only waits for suitable symbols representing this destruction-fantasy. In their dreams young individuals and especially girls often have fantasies of lying in caskets. Freud teaches that the resting in caskets is a symbol of resting in the womb (casket = uterus). Stekel supplements the teaching quite rightly by saying that the grave has the same meaning as the casket, whereby “grave digging” has an unmistakable significance, (to dig [graben] and to bury [begraben], like to bore and be born [bohren und geboren sein]. So the grave turns into heaven, just as the mental image of the people has it that one comes out of the grave (through death) into heaven.
The patient Mrs. M. (16) has an extensive symbolism: She comes to new life as she, in accordance with Christian beliefs, dies in Christ. If death is thought of as a sexual uniting, which, by the way, the patient proves through numerous fantasies referring to Christ, she must, as earlier explained, identify with Christ (the beloved), must transform herself into Christ. She also turns into Christ , lies prostrated on the floor and claims that she is crucified; she wants to save all the sick people. Finally she is, like Christ, the life-giving grave. Prof. Forel = Dr. J., to whom she has “transferred” [übertragen], comes to her as Christ into the death chamber (her room): He is “buried alive” and comes again into the world in the form of a vine. In a sense, this vine, which signifies new life, is the child. Now and then the patient also says she transformed herself into a little Forel. She says she turns into a little Forel, because she is handled roughly, is beaten—hence again, thorough destruction. Another time her child-producing organism (organ) is a glass coffin or a broken porcelain bowl. Here lie the bones of her stillborn child; the porcelain pieces have to be pulverized, cooked, etc., with the child's bones and other fertilizing [befruchtenden] substances, so that a child materializes. It is essential that death is necessary for the materialization of life and, in accordance with Christian beliefs, the dead is made alive through death. In the mythological image burial = fertilization. The correctness of this assertion is really impressive, if one is working in mythology.
“For the procreation of the new generation,” says the patient, “the whole body must be prepared; from the head (psyche) and from the spermatic development of the animal the new generation arises.… Novozoon (= Sperm) is dead matter.”
This last sentence also indicates that sperm is interpreted as a dead excretion. Irma, the patient analyzed by Binswanger, is disgusted by coitus and by corpse-eating [Leichenfrasse]. If eating is the same to her as copulating, then the corpse = sperm, which is taken in. Irma also has an extended coffin-symbolism, but in contrast to a normal individual she is in constant dread of these images. For a normal girl the burial-image is blissful, as long as she imagines wasting away in the beloved. A young girl said to Binswanger, “The greatest happiness would be for her [sic, for me?] to rest inside the body of the beloved.” Irma also imagines from time to time “Death is a beautiful man,” but this only for a short moment, for soon images of pure destruction take over with their accompanying understandable anxiety. Irma describes the feeling as
[T]he feeling of wildness, of having one's fling, complete surrender, and of being overpowered, in which one does not know what she does and what becomes of her.
 One is poisoned (hence the long snake fits so well as a sexual animal), becomes dangerously sick, as the symbolism of Mrs. M. and other patients attests. Then one is destroyed in pregnancy by the child, which develops at the expense of the mother, like a malignant tumor. To my medical colleagues, the material for a corresponding symbol formation was abundantly available, and the unconscious also understood how to use it. Thus one dreamed that her little brother (wish-personality) had a “dove growing” in his stomach (dove as symbol of innocence); then a dove comes out of his mouth. The other colleague gets boils on the neck, like Mrs. M. Still another gets cancerous tumors on the fingers in her dream sometimes; or some assistant, to whom she had “transferred” [“übertragen”], asked her in a dream about a cancerous tumor (exhibition dream); still others get scarlet fever, etc. Each sexual symbol in a dream, as in mythology, signifies the life- or death-bringing god. One example that stands for all of them is the horse, one of the recognized sexual animals; it is the life-bringing animal of the sun god. The horse, however, is also the death animal, yes, the symbol of death.(17)
Destruction images among various forms of self-satisfaction are very instructive. Psychic autoeroticism can be studied very well in Nietzsche. With Nietzsche, who remained lonely [einsam] his whole life long, his whole libido was directed toward his own person. How did Nietzsche interpret love? Or, more correctly, how did he experience [empfinden] love? Loneliness tormented the poet so severely that he created an ideal friend for himself, Zarathustra, with whom he identified. The yearning for a love object made him become in himself both man and woman, and both of them in the form of Zarathustra.
For it comes already, the blazing, its love comes to earth. All sun-love is innocence and creative urge! Look there, how impatiently it comes over the sea. Don't you feel the thirst and the hot breath of its love? It wants to suck on the sea and drink its depth up to itself on high: there the desires of the sea heave upward with a thousand breasts. It wants to be kissed and sucked by the thirst of the sun. It wants to become lust, the height and the footpath of light, even light itself. Truly, like the sun I love life and all the deep seas. And this is my knowledge: Everything deep shall rise up to my height. Thus spake Zarathustra.
 As love, for Nietzsche, consists in sucking into himself the deep sea, like the sun, so it is with knowledge. Hence knowledge for Nietzsche is nothing other than a yearning for love, for creation. The blazing sun sucks at the sea like a lover, and the wildly heaving sea lifts itself with a thousand breasts toward the sun, craving for kisses like an enraptured woman [Weib]. The fantasy of breast-sucking indicates here that the sun comports itself like a child toward the sea. I remember how Silberer too, in his second example of the hypnagogic phenomenon, represents the land of the Mothers as a sea. As the sun sucks the sea into itself, so the knowing Zarathustra sucks the depth (the deep sea) into himself. The yearning for knowledge is hence for the poet nothing else but the yearning after the mother living in his depth. If the mother is his own depth, then the uniting with the mother is at the same time to be interpreted autoerotically, hence a uniting with oneself. At another place Nietzsche pokes fun at the preachers of so called “pure love,” the unblemished knowledge without any desire, who deceive themselves by encasing a snake in the larva of a god (cf. Jung: deity—one's own libido—snake).
“Truly, you do not love the earth as the creating, generating, becoming one,” he cries out there. “Where is innocence?—Wherever there is the will to create, and whoever wants to create beyond himself, only he has the purest will. Where is beauty? Where I must will with all my will; where I will to love and to perish, so that a picture does not remain only a picture” (cf. the earlier discussion: With activation a physical content—“picture” [Bild] is destroyed, or is activated through destruction.) “To love and to perish; that has made sense since eternity. The will to love: that is also the will to die!'”
Through uniting in love with the mother, Nietzsche himself becomes the generating, creating, becoming mother. This mother-being [Muttersein] is still more clearly expressed in the following speech:
“You creative ones, you higher people! Whoever must give birth—is sick; however, whoever has given birth is unclean. Ask the women: one does not give birth because it is entertainment: the pain makes hens and poets cackle. You creative ones, much is unclean in you! It means you would have to be mothers.”
With that it appears we have learned to understand much about Nietzsche, and I believe that this process may  shed some light on why we so often, if not continually, find homosexual components among dementia-praecox patients living in autoerotic isolation. (18) Nietzsche turns into a woman in that he identifies with his mother, whereby he sucks her into himself. Here must be added that Nietzsche, in consequence of his autoerotic isolation, does not even live consciously in the present, but in his own depth, which still belongs to the time when the child, insufficiently differentiated in his sex life [Geschlechtsleben], while sucking the breast, behaves toward the mother passively like a woman [weiblich]. If Nietzsche is like a woman, his mother acts like a man to him, just as the depth later does, taking the place of the mother, or his “bottomless thought” which will soon be discussed, with which he battled as with himself. The mother is for Nietzsche he himself, and he himself—his mother.
In each love one must distinguish two directions of imaging [Vorstellungsrichtungen]: one, how one loves, and the other, how one is loved. In the first case one is oneself the subject and loves the object projected outward. In the second, one is transformed into the beloved and loves oneself as his object. With the man, who has the active task of conquering the woman, the subject-images govern. With the woman, on the other hand, who has to entice the man, even more normally the retrogressive [rückläufigen] images gain the upper hand. Connected with this is the well known feminine [weibliche] coquettishness: The woman considers how she will please “him,” with which the stronger homosexuality and autoeroticism of women are also connected.(19) Changed into her beloved, the woman must feel herself like a man to a certain degree, and as the object of the man she can love herself or another girl, which is her “wish-personality,” i.e., such as the lover wants to see herself, as more and more beautiful, of course. Once I met a colleague in great indignation over a series of envelopes she had addressed; on none of them did she succeed in writing the beautiful handwriting which she had put on the first envelope. I knew the handwriting. To my question what the desired handwriting meant to her, she suddenly recalled, entirely correctly, that her beloved wrote that way. The need for identification with the beloved was hence so great, that she could  only tolerate herself when she was being like him. In Tristan and Isolde we see the same thing. Tristan: “Tristan, you—no longer Tristan I-Isolde.” Isolde: “Isolde, you—no longer Isolde I-Tristan.” (20) The child is also autoerotic, since it plays a passive role opposite the parents; the child must struggle for the love of the parents and think about how to arouse their pleasure; it must imagine how it is loved and put itself accordingly into the role of a parent. In later years the girl sees in her mother a rival, but also her “wish-personality” which she loves as such, just as the boy does in his father. When the child is angered by her parents, the normal reaction would be revenge; this the child may not venture; therefore the anger will either be let out on some object, or the child in the first rage knows nothing better to do but, e.g., pull her hair, whereby she puts herself into the place of the parents who make her angry.
In Gogol's “The Accountant,” e.g., a governor is portrayed who is enormously conceited and exploits his serfs shamelessly. At the end he is himself deceived by a young con man, whom he had taken for the expected auditor. When the con man makes fun of everybody, not excepting the governor, in a letter which everybody gets to read, the scorn of the governor is turned back on himself: “Look at the old fool,” etc., he shouts. Also in this case the unsuccessful aggression evokes the regressive [rückläufige] series of images, the transformation into the subject directing scorn at himself as the object. Corresponding to the destructive component contained in the sexual instinct, the more actively disposed man also has more sadistic desires: He wants to destroy the beloved; the woman, who regards herself more as an object of love, wants to become destroyed [destruiert]. Of course, the boundary cannot be so sharply drawn, since each person is bisexual; further, since with the woman subject images, as with the man object images, are just as available, because of that, the woman is sadistic, the man—also masochistic. If the object-images gain in intensity through putting oneself into the place of the beloved individual, then the love directed against oneself leads to self-destruction as with self-castigation, martyrdom, yes, even the complete destruction [vernichtung] of one's sexuality, as in castration. These are only different forms and grades of self-destruction.
The act of procreation itself consists of self-destruction. Nietzsche's words allude to that: 
“A human being is something that must be overcome,” teaches Zarathustra, “so that the overman can come about.… And if now all ladders fail you, you must know how to climb onto your own head: how would you otherwise climb upwards?”
The sense of this sentence is: You must understand that you must overcome (destroy) yourself. How could you otherwise create the higher, the child? In the chapter “Bliss against Will,” Zarathustra complains:
“I lay enchained to the love of my children: Desire [Begehren] set this snare for me, the desire, that I would become my children's prey and lose myself to them.”
The child of Zarathustra, the “abysmal thought” of the eternal return of things, threatens to die unborn in Zarathustra, though Zarathustra shouts it into life.
“You stir, stretch, groan? Up! Up! Don't groan—you shall speak to me! Zarathustra the godless calls you! Zarathustra, the advocate of life, advocate of suffering, advocate of the circle! … Hail to me! You are coming. I hear you! My abyss speaks; I have brought my last depth up into the light. Hail to me! Here! Give your hand!—Ha! Stop! Ha-ha!—Yuck! Disgust! Horrors!—Woe is me!”
As Zarathustra, like the sun (the highest), sucks the deep sea into himself, so he now turns the deepest inside himself up into the light (Analog: the sun = love). We know that Nietzsche himself is the light (the high), which sucks inside himself his mother = the deep sea. Through this uniting with the mother Nietzsche became the birthing mother. Also here he turns his depth into his light and transports it into the world, like his child. This is reminiscent of the children's springs [Kinderbrunnen] in mythology: The dead are changed back into children and as such are born again. Wünsche, (21) who supplies numerous instances of them, remarks expressly in one place:
“The souls of the dead, climbing upwards to heaven in Holda's kingdom, however, cannot return again without further ado, but must first be renewed in their source.” Wünsche means that the image of the raising up of the new-born from springs and ponds forms the basis for the thought that vegetative and animal life sprouts up from the netherworld. That may be right, but if the unconscious takes its symbolism  from the plant world as a description of human birth, so must something essentially analogous happen with human birth: The children come into being from ponds, since in the womb they actually are in the pond (= amnionic fluid), from which they are to enter the external world. So Jung in his work, “Concerning Conflict in the Child's Soul,” shows how little Anna who, vividly involved with the question of childbirth, seeks the solution of the problem in the plant kingdom. She is interested in how the eyes, mouth and hair are grown on her, and finally, how her little brother Fritz has grown out of her mother (Mama = earth) and asks her father: “But how has little Fritz come into Mama? Has someone set (planted) him there? Has someone put in a little seed?” She sees still other analogous events in the plant world to which her unconscious attention leads her, since they are suitable as symbols of the secret she is preoccupied with. At the age of three years Anna heard that children were little angels, who live in heaven and are brought to earth by the stork. One day she asks her grandmother:
Anna: “Grandmother, why do you have such wrinkled eyes?”
Grandmother: “Simply because I am already old.”
Anna: “Yes, but will you later be young again?”
Grandmother: “No, you know, I will get older and older, and then I will die.”
Anna: “And then will you become a little baby again?”
It is most interesting that to little Anna the idea that her old grandma could turn herself back into a baby appears entirely natural. Before the grandmother speaks of death and of little angels (which, as Anna heard, come to earth), she asks the grandmother by herself whether she then will be young again; hence she does not wonder whether the grandmother will be an angel, rather in her mind she immediately completes the answer in the sense of back-formation [zurückverwandeln]. There are surely enough examples known of patients who want to have children, seeing themselves transformed into children. A beautiful example is the Nun in the Temple of Amida (22) by Riklin. Mrs. M. becomes a little Forel through the sexual act with Prof. Forel. Rank observantly calls attention to dreams in which birth symbolism is represented backwards; instead of pulling a child out of the water, e.g., one puts it into the water.  This symbol comes into being by way of identification. One evening a colleague (a physician) told me how happy she would be to have a child. The following night she dreamed that she had to creep into a narrow passage way which had no exit but ended in the building (like the birth canal in the womb). I let her show me how she crouched, and she remembers that she mimicked exactly the movements of a child at birth in the first or second cranial position. With that she feared she could go no farther, the passage way being too narrow and becoming even narrower, so that she is nearly crushed. Patient Mrs. M. (dementia praecox) sees herself placed into the water with the children, and the souls are then saved through Christ, i.e., come as children again into the world (since indeed destruction leads to becoming). Nietzsche too supplies a similar destruction symbolism with the birth of his thought, which for him takes the place of a child. Zarathustra defends himself against the act of creation with expressions of disgust, as if creation were something unclean. One recalls his words: “whoever must bear children—is sick; but whoever has given birth—is unclean.” Naturally, the thought representing the place of the child must be so formed that it contains the most horrible right next to the most desirable, to be able to be fair to the yearning of Zarathustra to lose himself in his children. This is also the case: The thought expresses the highest, that the overman will always return, and the lowest, that the smallest human will always return. Since Nietzsche continually concerns himself with the highest life affirmation, his wish-thought tells him at the same time that this affirmation cannot come forth without negation; in the highest the lowest is also contained. This gruesome component is also actually capable of overpowering Zarathustra: Seven days he lies there motionless as if dead; he struggles there with a horrifying animal, which is his own depth, thus his own sexual personality. He bites the head off the animal—hence he kills his own sexuality, and in killing himself his abysmal thought attains the highest power of life [Lebenskraft] and with it arises the resurrected Nietzsche.
The saga of Russian Prince Oleg is interesting. He is prophesied that he will be killed by his most beloved horse. In order to escape from this verdict, he gives his horse over to his servants and has it treated especially well. After a time he finds out that his horse is dead. He stands mourning on its grave  and curses the deceitful soothsayer. While he is lamenting, a snake comes out of the skull of the horse and gives the hero the deadly bite. The horse is the sexuality of Oleg. It dies and with it Oleg, since the snake = the sexual desire directs itself against him.
Here creation does not come out of destruction, as perhaps with Nietzsche; on the contrary, it is shown that the most dearly loved, the life-bringing sexual animal, can become the source of death. It is striking how passionate poets like to die in their works. Take, for example, Romeo and Juliet by Shakespeare. The motive for the generating of love between the offspring of parents who hate each other is surely instructive. In a certain psychological sense hate is the same as love; the same deeds are committed from hatred as from stormy love. Hate is negative love in regard to the conscious present, in regard to the activation. Since, however, at its strongest hate struggles through activation against the destruction of the image-content, the love-images in the hater's unconscious are extraordinarily vigorous. If the usual, tamed libido goes about with weak destruction-images as, e.g., with teasing, hurting, which has caused the formation of such proverbs as “those who love each other, tease each other,” so the wild passion of a sadist unloads itself in hideous scenes which can intensify to lustful murder [Lustmorde]. If a weak sympathy arises out of the weak negation with the cessation of the causes hampering the positive accent of the libido-images, it results in a blazing passion with the unleashing of images not admitted to activation through hate. This passion is compelled to destroy, since it is too strong to be able to control itself at some self-preservation barrier. Shakespeare describes this: His violently loving heroes cannot be satisfied with the activation of a small part of the libido, which would be necessary to an ordinary love affair. They must always have more obstacles onto which they unload the destruction impulse [Zerstörungsdrang], but no obstacle is great enough to pacify the passion, which only finds peace with complete destruction, with the death of the personality. Just as on one hand the too strong fixation of the libido on the parents makes a transference to the external world impossible, since no object corresponds completely to the  parents, so too the unsatisfied libido (23) fixes itself again on the parents; incest fantasies or more sublimated fantasy symptoms emerge into reality, e.g., in the form of nature worship or religious symptoms. At the same time, the unsatisfied destruction impulse contained in the reproduction drive increases in tension, likewise producing concrete or more sublimated death fantasies. However, the death-image, connected with the incest-wish, does not mean: “I die, since I do not want to commit the sin,” but “I am dead” means, “I have reached the longed-for retroversion [Rückversetzung] into the begetter, and I die in him.” The more strongly pronounced destruction-wish corresponds to the stronger becoming-wish in the lesser differentiated incestuous love. That the source of the death-images is not to be sought in incest thoughts, is proven amply through dreams and myths, in which one has children by one's parents and siblings, which are accordingly becoming-fantasies. Freud showed that every dream image means its opposite at the same time, and Freud also shows that linguistics recognizes an “opposite meaning of the primary words.” Bleuler with the ambivalence concept and Stekel with his concept of bipolarity say that next to the positive drive a negative drive is always present. Jung believes that both drives are equally strong, in case we do not notice them; it is enough that there is a little preponderance of one drive [Antriebes], of one wish, and it seems to us as if we only wished this one.
This teaching helps to explain quite well why one overlooks the death-instinct in the sexual-instinct. Under normal conditions the becoming-images must predominate somewhat, particularly since becoming is the result of destruction, is occasioned by destruction; and, of course, it is much easier to think about the end results instead of always seeking the cause. However, it does not take much to give preponderance to the destruction-images, especially with children and emotional people. The destruction component predominates in neurosis and expresses itself in all the symptoms of resistance against life and natural fate.
Each content appearing in consciousness is a differentiation-product stemming from other psychologically older contents. This content is adapted to the present and receives a specific, immediate color, which the character of the I-relation lends it. Hence there  exists in us a differentiation-tendency. If we want to make this specific content, which is accessible only to us, understandable to others, then we make a back-differentiation; we strip the content of the specific personal and express it in the general, in symbolic form, valid for the type. Therewith we follow the second tendency in us, which stands in opposition to the first, the assimilating or dissolving tendency. Assimilation causes the unity which is regarded as “we” to be formed from a unity regarded as “I.” The dissolving and assimilating of a personal experience into the form of an art work, a dream, or a pathological symbolism transforms this into a type-experience and makes a “we” from the “I.” (24) The appearance of desire [Lust] or lack of desire [Unlust] is tied to the production or the decrease of the I-relation. If the personal experience is already transformed into a type-experience, then we behave toward it like spectators, who only then empathize [empfmden] when they can put themselves into the image. Such spectators are the dementia-praecox sufferers, and so are we in our dreams. To the self-preservation drive in us correspond the differentiation tendency and the inertia of a crystallized I-particle or of the entire I-personality. The type-preservation drive is a reproduction-drive and also expresses itself psychically in the dissolution and assimilation tendencies (transforming of the I into a we) with the following new differentiation out of “primal matter” [“Urstoffe”]. “Where love rules, the I, the sinister despot, dies.” With love the dissolution of the I in the beloved is at the same time the strongest self-affirmation, a new I-life in the person of the beloved. If love is lacking, then the image of a change of the psychic or bodily individual is under the influence of an alien power, as in the sexual act a destruction- or death-image.
The self-preservation drive is a simple drive, which only consists of a positive; and the type-preservation drive, which must dissolve the old, so that the new comes about, consists of a positive and a negative component. The type-preservation drive is in its essence ambivalent; thus the arousal of the positive component at the same time evokes the arousal of the negative component, and vice versa. The self-preservation drive is a “static” drive insofar as  it has to protect the already existing individual against foreign influences. The type-preservation drive is a “dynamic” drive, which strives for the transformation, the “resurrection” of the individual in a new form. No transformation can proceed without destruction of the old state.
Psychoanalysis and Contemporary Thought, 18:85-118 (1995).
1.- .- When I wrote this work, Dr. Stekel's “The language of dreams” had not yet appeared. In his work he shows in numerous dreams that next to the wish to live we have the wish to die. The latter he perceives as opposite to the wish to live, which is essentially rooted in the sexual instinct. [Stekel, Wilhelm, 1868-1940. Die sprache des traumes. Eine darstellung der symbolik und deutung des traumes in ihren bezeihungen zur kranken und gesunden seele, fur arzte und psychologen (The Language of Dreams: A Statement of the Symbolism and Meaning of Dreams in their Relationship with Sick and Healthy Minds, For Physicians and Psychologists), Wiesbaden, J. F. Bergmann, 1911.]
2.- “Wandlungen und Symbole der Libido” [“Transformations and Symbols of the Libido”] Jahrbuch, Vol. 3.
3.- The very last lines of Faust, Part 2, are spoken by the Chorus Mysticus: Goethea Atkinsb Kaufmanna Alles Vergängliche 1st nur ein Gleichnis; Das Unzulängliche All that is transitory; is only a symbol what seems unachievable What is destructible Is but a parable; What fails ineluctably Hier wird's reignis; Das Unbeschreibliche, Hier ist's getan; Das Ewig-Weibliche Zieht uns hinan. here is seen undone; what's indescribable here becomes fact; Woman, eternally, shows us the way. The undeclarable, Here it was een, Here it was action; The Eternal-Feminine Lures to perfection. a W. Kaufmann, trans. (1961), Goethe's Faust, New York: Doubleday, pp. 502-503. b Atkins, S. P., ed. & trans. (1984), Faust: A Tragedy, Cambridge, MA: Suhrkamp/Insel Publishers Boston, p. 305.
4.- [Mephistopheles sends Faust on a dangerous journey, protected by a magic key, to fetch Helen and Paris for the entertainment of the Emperor: “You force me to reveal a higher mystery.—Majestic goddesses enthroned in solitude apart from space, outside of time—to speak of them I find embarrassing—these are the Mothers! … And strange they are. No mortal knows these goddesses, whom even we are loath to name. You'll have to plumb the lowest depths to find their home, but it's your fault we need their help.” Faust, Part 2, Act 1, S. Atkins, trans. (1984), p. 159.]
5.- According to Freud the unconscious is timeless in this respect, that it consists only of desires, which it produces for the realized present. Freud: Traum-deutung [The Interpretation of Dreams].
6.- Freud: “Über den Gegensinn der Urworte” [“The Contrary Meanings of Primary Words”].
7.- “Uber den psychologischen Inhalt eines Falles von Schizophrenic” [“On the Psychological Content of a Case of Schizophrenia”], Psychoanal. Contemp. Thought [Jahrbuch], Vol. 3, p. 329ff.
8.- Cf. Spielrein, “Schizophrenic,” Jahrbuch, Vol. 3, Part 1. Schlussbetrach-tungen [Concluding reflections].
9.- Cf. Spielrein, “Schizophrenic,” Jahrbuch, Vol. 3, Part 1.
10.- She can also have a strong negative affect from the image of the fouled earth if she thereby has the feeling for it, therefore the connection earth = I.
11.- Cf. Freud: “Der Witz und seine Beziehung zum Unbewussten” [“The Joke and Its Connection with the Unconscious”].
12.- Why doesn't the artist always paint the picture of his beloved mother, but rather produces a Renaissance picture? The “censor” does not forbid us to love the “mother” in “subliminal” form.
13.- We experience, yes, or rather we regard and call experience only that which we have already experienced in our ancestors.
14.- Jung, “Symbole und Wandlungen der Libido” [“Symbols and Transformations of the Libido”]. Jahrbuch, Vol. 3, 1st half.
15.- Cf. my above-cited article
16.- Cf. Negelein: “Das Pferd im Seelenglauben und Totenkult” [“The Horse in Spiritual Belief and the Cult of Death”]. Jahrbuch, Vol. 4.
17.- Cf. Otto Rank: Beiträge zum Narzissismus [“Contributions to Narcissism”]. Jahrbuch 3, 1st half.
18.- Consider the passionate kissing and hugging among young girls. This type of friendship, not remarkable among women, would seem very peculiar among men.
19.- [Wagner, in the Schirmer edition, has it as follows:
Isolde: “Du Isolde, Tristan ich, nicht mehr Isolde!”
Tristan: “Tristan du, ich Isolde, nicht mehr Tristan!”
(Richard Wagner (1906), Tristan and Isolde. New York: Schirmer, pp. 191-192).
Spielrein puts it differently:
Tristan: “Tristan, du—nicht mehr Tristan Ich-Isolde”
Isolde: “Isolde, du—nicht mehr Isolde Ich-Tristan.”]
20.- Cf. Otto Rank: “Lohengrinsage.” Schriften zur angewandten Seelenkunde [“The Saga of Lohengrin.” Writings on Applied Psychology], Published by Freud.
21.- “Ex oriente lux, Die Sagen vom Lebensbaum und Lebenswasser, altorient Mythen” [“The Sagas of the Tree of Life and the Water of Life, Old Oriental Myths”] by A. Wünsch, Leipzig, 1905.
22.- Riklin: “Wunscherfüllung und Symbolik im Märchen.” Schriften zur angewandten Seelenkunde [“Wish Fulfillment and Symbolism in Fairytales,” Writings on Applied Psychology].
23.- Cf. Imago by Spitteler.
24.- Über den psychologischen Inhalt eines Falles von Schizophrenic [“On the Psychological Content of a Case of Schizophrenia”]